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Abstract Reasoning, defined as the production and
evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The
dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of
reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mech-
anism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the
lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to
reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, rea-
soning systematically searches for reasons that support the
reasoner’s initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons
cursorily. By contrast, reasoners are well able to evaluate
others’ reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting
weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning
accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the
evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments
to convince others and to change one’s mind when con-
fronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, how-
ever, is often described as being at odds with such an
argumentative mechanisms: scientists are supposed to
reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when
their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In
this article, we review evidence showing that scientists,
when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay
people while being able to change their mind when con-
fronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argu-
mentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of
scientists’ reasoning and that differences in the way
scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional
framework of science.
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1 Introduction
Scientists reason. Reasoning, we claim, is a psychological
ability meant to deal with social interactions. More precisely,
reasoning is geared towards convincing others of the truth of
some proposition and being convinced only by good argu-
ments. It is geared towards argumentation. We will show that
these claims about the evolved function of reasoning, sub-
sumed under the argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier
and Sperber 2011a), are well supported by historical and
psychological evidence from science studies. Reciprocally,
we will hint at new insights the argumentative theory of
reasoning could bring to our understanding of scientific
practices and their social aspects.
The social view of reasoning put forward by the argu-
mentative theory seems at first hard to reconcile with the
typical understanding of the place of reasoning in science.
More often than not, the social aspects of scientific
knowledge production have been decried as forces working
against rationality.1 Rationality, by contrast, is equated
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1 Barnes et al. (1996) have done much arguing against this
presupposition, which favors a normative analysis of scientific
knowledge production and prevent a naturalistic one. These authors
also often accuse their detractors of making this assumption. For
instance, Bloor (1997) answering Cole (1995). Note also that, in the
same article, Bloor looks at the psychological origin of biases and the
social dynamic that leads to cancelling out individual biases: a point
elaborated within the argumentative theory of reasoning (Sperber and
Mercier 2012).
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with the thinking of the lone scientist. Scientists might
have inherited the problem they deal with from others; they
might have social interests; but ultimately it is through
reasoning, with its power to uncover the truth, that scien-
tists devise new theories. Yet the dichotomy that separates,
on the one hand, the social and the contextual phenomena
and, on the other hand, the individual and epistemic facts,
has long been decried (Bloor 1976). Decades of sociology
of science have shown that science is an enterprise that
involves social interactions in non-trivial ways: the distri-
bution of labor (e.g. Giere 2002), the historical construction
of epistemic standards (e.g. Knorr Cetina 1991), and the
collective assessment of theories (e.g. Latour 1993) are
cases in point. But reasoning remains the last and most
important bastion of individualism in epistemology and
science studies.2 When we assert that the function of rea-
soning is argumentative, we give to social interactions a
key role in reasoning. Reasoning is something that happens
in the individual mind, yet, it is a cognitive ability that is
geared for dealing with social interactions. How does
reasoning’s argumentative function play out in the context
of science? And what are the consequences for science, its
practices, its institutions, and its epistemic status?
Psychologists of science have looked at the social
embedding of scientific thinking: ideas of great scientists
are generated in, and on the basis of, a rich social context
(e.g. Osbeck et al. 2013). We claim that theories—or at
least the justifications that support them—are not only
developed from others’ ideas and values, but also for oth-
ers, within an argumentative dynamic. Thus, scientists’
individual reasoning is more related to social interactions
than what psychologists of science have acknowledged.
Conversely, sociologists of science have been reluctant to
consider individual cognition. Some have feared that
integrating the psychology of reasoning into their work
would be tantamount to a return to non-naturalistic rational
redescriptions of belief formation. Rational redescription is
a normative approach, which consists in specifying what
reasons should have been considered and which rational
inferences should have been made (Lakatos 1970). Our
approach avoids this pitfall by remaining naturalistic
throughout: we specify the role of reasoning in science as a
psychological process. As such, we hope it can contribute
to bridging the gap between psychology and sociology of
science.
Our paper proceeds as follow. We start by offering a
definition of reasoning and contrasting an individualistic to
a social view of reasoning. In particular, we outline a
theory that makes of reasoning a mechanism aimed at
argumentation. This argumentative theory of reasoning
makes several predictions regarding the traits and func-
tioning of reasoning. In several cases, these predictions
clash with common beliefs about the way scientists reason.
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 review these predictions and gather
evidence showing that scientists’ reasoning skills are
essentially the same as everyone else’s. We also point to
some significant differences in the efficacy of reasoning in
science compared to other applications of reasoning and
suggest that they are due to differences in the social context
in which science takes place rather than to any intrinsic
particularity in scientists’ reasoning.
2 Characterizing Scientific Reasoning
2.1 What Reasoning Is
While most people agree about the importance of reasoning
in our mental lives, the type of cognitive mechanism
scholars call ‘reasoning’ varies widely. Some use ‘rea-
soning’ to refer to just about any inferential mechanism of
‘higher’, non-perceptual, cognition, others use the term to
describe explicit, conscious thinking (e.g. Kahneman
2003). In the psychology of science, reasoning can refer to
any of the mental activities of scientists, especially given
that these psychological processes are presumably truth
oriented and satisfy some rationality criteria. Reasoning
can also denote a subset of cognitive processes that satisfies
some epistemic criteria—inductive reasoning as described
logical positivists, for instance. The norm of rationality is
here what operates the distinction between reasoning and
other activities. But some more recent uses of the term
‘scientific reasoning’ are of a clearly descriptive nature.
Model-based reasoning, for instance, is the label used to
describe a specific category of cognitive processes—mak-
ing use of a model to derive information about a target
domain—that is shown to play an important role in science
(Magnani and Nersessian 2002).
For the purposes of this article, we would like to identify
a specific cognitive activity that is close to what we com-
monly understand as ‘reasoning.’ We use reasoning to refer
to inferential mechanisms that pay attention to, and pro-
duce, reasons (see, Mercier and Sperber 2011a). This
characterization of reasoning has the advantage of distin-
guishing intuitive inferences and inferences based on rea-
sons, grasping an important aspect of human cognitive
processes. Cognitive science has shown that we continu-
ously perform complex inferences without necessarily
being aware of it or having considered reasons for doing so.
For instance, when John tells Paula ‘‘It’s going to rain,’’
Paula infers that it is going to rain where John is. Crucially,
she doesn’t have to go through reasons to draw this
2 This points reflects the more general debate in sociology between
social determination and rational agency. The role of reasoning is
made very explicit in Boudon (1995).
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inference; she doesn’t have to think ‘‘If John had wanted
me to understand it was going to rain somewhere else, he
would have said so, so it must be going to rain where he
is.’’ Such inferential mechanisms, which do not rely on
reasons, perform ‘intuitive inferences’ or, for short, intu-
itions. By contrast, if John had said ‘‘It’s going to rain
because the weather report said so,’’ he would have offered
Paula a reason (the weather report said so) for accepting a
conclusion (it’s going to rain). When John finds this reason,
and when Paula evaluates it, they do not engage only in
intuitive inference. They actively consider reasons,
engaging in what can be called ‘reflective inference’ or
reasoning. Reasoning thus characterized is a metarepre-
sentational mechanism with a specific function: finding and
evaluating reasons that bear on a conclusion’s value.
Most scientific cognition is not reasoning in our
restricted use. In particular, scientific model-based rea-
soning includes inferences produced by cognizing the
model. Such inferences need not be reflective. For instance,
a scientist might use a drawing to represent a complex
phenomenon. The aspects of the drawing might generate
intuitive inferences that are then, possibly reflectively,
applied to solve the problem at hand (Nersessian 2008,
chap. 3). Which cognitive processes are intuitive and which
are reflective is an interesting question that is better asked
once we have identified reasoning ‘proper’ among the
multiple types of human inferences.
Evans and others (Evans 2003; Sloman 1996; Stanovich
2004) assert that reasoning corresponds to conscious,
explicit, effortful, and slow thinking—it forms the basis of
dual-process theories of reasoning. However, many cog-
nitive processes that share these traits are not reasoning as
we characterized it. For instance, one can use perception in
a conscious, effortful manner—when trying to perceive
some dim astronomical phenomenon, for instance. It is also
better to distinguish reasoning from other conscious,
explicit mechanisms that share some of its properties, such
as some forms of planning or theory of mind (Mercier and
Sperber 2011b).
Even thought scientific cognition is not all reasoning (by
our definition), even in this restricted view reasoning play a
very important role in science. Most scientific beliefs are
held because of reasons. Indeed, one striking aspect of
science is that it goes beyond intuitive beliefs—beliefs held
primarily thanks to intuitive mechanisms. Illustrations
abound: we intuit that the earth is flat and not moving, or
that matter is dense. At the same time, we have reasons to
think that the earth is spherically shaped, that it moves
around the sun at 30 km per second and that matter is
mostly void. Such beliefs arise because scientific practices
include the development of reflective beliefs, i.e. proposi-
tions that are believed to be true because we have reasons
to do so (Sperber 1997). Note that saying that most
scientific beliefs are reflective beliefs does not mean that
intuitive inferences play little role in scientific thinking, it
only means that some intuitions are not taken at face value.
In fact, developing reflective beliefs is a cognitive process
made of numerous intuitive inferences—including the
intuitive dimension of reasoning itself, the intuition that a
given representations is a good reason to hold another
representation (Mercier and Heintz 2013). The important
point for our argument, however, is that scientific cognitive
practices, however rich and multiple, however anchored in,
or scaffolded upon, intuitive beliefs (Heintz 2013), include
a systematic appeal to reasons.
2.2 Individualistic and Social Perspectives
on Reasoning
The study of reasoning has been dominated by what can be
dubbed the ‘classical view of reasoning’. Explicitly or
implicitly, philosophers and psychologists generally treat
reasoning as a mechanism that aims at improving the rea-
soner’s beliefs and decisions, usually by examining the
reasoner’s own reasons in order to discard unjustified
beliefs and not to make poorly supported decisions. While
Descartes was the strongest proponent of the classical
view, we find it more recently in the work of cognitive
psychologists such as Daniel Kahneman (2003), for whom
‘‘one of the functions of System 2 [reasoning] is to monitor
the quality of both mental operations and overt behavior’’
(p. 699).
This classical view of reasoning is related to the standard
view of science in the form of the ‘lonely genius’. According
to this view, science—at least the most important aspect of
it—is a solitary endeavor: when scientists aren’t conducting
experiments, they engage in intense but lonely reflection.
This is especially true of the ‘geniuses’ such as Newton,
Darwin or Einstein. Stephen Shapin has traced the origins of
this trope—the solitary thinker—to Greek thought and
demonstrated its importance in the popular view of scientists
since the scientific revolution (Shapin 1991). These brilliant
thinkers seemingly escape the biased and superficial nature
of everyday reasoning not by arguing together, but through
intense, focused ratiocination.
Decades of sociology of science have shown that this
view is erroneous: most scientific practices make sense
only within the social context in which they take place; and
all scientific achievements result from the efforts of many
people. But despite the weight of social studies of science,
scientific reasoning seems to resist the invasion of socio-
logical analysis. On the science war front, both camps see
reason as the ultimate place that is safe from sociological
analysis. Defenders of the rationality of science against
relativism could put rationality just there: in scientists’
reasoning capacities. Protagonists on the other side of the
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front have seen in reasoning another attempt to resist nat-
uralistic inquiries. Reasoning, understood as the last
stronghold of rationality, is just a philosophical myth to be
disregarded altogether. Latour provides a good example of
arguments along those lines.3 However, whether this crit-
icism is right or not, it can only target a normative view of
reasoning, not a naturalistic one. Unfortunately, when La-
tour refuses to consider reasoning, he does not save, but
hinders the naturalistic enquiry of a key mental and social
practice in science: producing and evaluating reasons.
The classical view of reasoning is not only incompatible
with the conclusions of sociologists of science, but also
with psychological data. More often than not, reasoning
does not do what the classical view would have it do, as it
fails to critically examine our reasons. Instead reasoning
looks for confirmatory evidence and disregards contradic-
tory evidence of one’s prior belief (myside bias4). More-
over, reasoning satisfies itself with shallow justifications
and weak arguments. As a result, reasoning often bolsters
the reasoner’s beliefs, whether they are right or wrong,
rather than correct them (references for all these claims
will be provided as they are explored in the context of
scientific reasoning).
To account for these puzzling findings, Hugo Mercier
and Dan Sperber have formulated a different hypothesis
about the function of reasoning (Mercier and Sperber
2011a; Sperber 2001). Reasoning didn’t evolve to serve the
solitary reasoner; it evolved to argue: to find arguments in
order to convince others and to evaluate others’ arguments
in order to decide if one should change one’s mind. This
argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for reasoning’s
most striking traits (Mercier 2013). The myside bias,
observed low investment in evaluating one’s own argu-
ments, and several other aspects of reasoning are, as we
will show, consequences of the first function of reasoning:
convincing an audience. The other function of reasoning is
to evaluate others’ arguments so as to update one’s beliefs
only when there are good reasons to do so. We will show
that we are quite good at telling apart good from bad
arguments, when these arguments are put forward by oth-
ers. As a result, when two people argue, if one person is
wrong and the other is right, the latter is more likely to
convince the former than the other way around. This means
that groups tend to outperform individuals on reasoning
tasks, sometimes by a wide margin. The first goal of this
article is to show that these properties of reasoning, well
documented among laypeople, also apply to reasoning in
science. A secondary goal is to specify the social and
institutional contexts that make scientific thinking none-
theless as successful as we know it. In this essay, we
especially focus on the first goal, even though we briefly
broach the second.
3 The Myside Bias
3.1 How to Demonstrate a Genuine Myside Bias
One of the most distinctive traits of the argumentative
theory is to account for the myside bias as an adaptive
feature of reasoning. When reasoning produces arguments
to convince an audience, it is adaptive to mostly find
arguments that support the reasoner’s position. Our goal in
this section is to specify what constitutes a genuine myside
bias and to show that scientists have such a bias when they
reason to produce arguments.
In his review of the topic, Nickerson defines the myside
bias as the ‘‘seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that
are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in
hand’’ (Nickerson 1998, p. 175). He cites dozens of experi-
ments purporting to demonstrate the existence of such a bias,
including some experiments conducted with scientists.
However, we do not want to lightly accuse scientists of
being partial or biased before checking whether it is not just a
feature of some rational (in the normative sense) cognitive
process. And indeed, the interpretation of many of the results
cited by Nickerson has been disputed. In particular, many
findings can be interpreted not as resulting from biases, but as
the consequences of epistemically sound Bayesian infer-
ences with very strong prior beliefs. The essence of a
Bayesian inference is to take a prior belief (also known as
base rate) into account and update it with new information. It
has been argued that Bayesian inference well describes sci-
entific reasoning (Horwich 1982; Howson and Urbach
2005). Numerous psychology experiments have been used to
criticize both lay people and experts’ failure to take prior
beliefs into account when estimating the probability of an
event. But taking priors into account can also look like a
myside bias. For instance, as pointed out by Koehler (1993),
if a scientist’s assessment of, say, an article, is tainted by her
3 ‘‘In order to reach that aim [developing a naturalistic anthropology
of science], we have to abandon many intermediary beliefs: belief in
[…] the power of reason’’ (Latour 1993: p. 150). In the context of the
‘science war,’ where scientists opposed some theories of science and
conceptual methods in social studies of science, Latour points out
what he takes to be the misguided assumptions of his contradictors: ‘‘I
quickly unearthed what appeared to me to be a fundamental
presupposition of those who reject ‘‘social’’ explanations of science.
This is the assumption that force is different in kind to reason; right
can never be reduce to reason’’ (p. 153). By contrast, we stick with the
old fashioned idea that there is a difference between being constrained
by physical force and being convinced by the force of an argument.
The latter, however, can also be studied in a naturalistic way with
cognitive science.
4 We prefer to use ‘‘myside bias’’ rather than the more commonly
used ‘‘confirmation bias’’ because reasoning does not have a bias to
confirm everything, but rather to find reasons that support the
reasoner’s side.
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prior views on the topic, this is typically understood as an
indictment of her objectivity. However, in a Bayesian
framework, it is sensible to give little weight to a result that
seems implausible based on one’s priors: the result is more
likely to be bogus than the prior belief is likely to be false.
If a given behavior can be easily explained using a
standard normative framework such as Bayesianism, it is
uneconomical to invoke the myside bias. Accordingly, a
first trademark of the genuine myside bias is that it cannot
be accounted within such normative frameworks, at least if
one considers an individual in isolation. Moreover, by
violating normative standards, a genuine myside bias often
has epistemically deleterious consequences, such as
strengthening one’s beliefs with no rational reason.
In spite of these caveats making the myside bias rela-
tively difficult to demonstrate, the experimental evidence
indicates that the myside bias is a robust and prevalent
feature of reasoning. Mercier and Sperber (2011a) have
reviewed the evidence, at least concerning lay people. In
the next section, we focus on evidence related scientific
reasoning.
3.2 Myside Bias Among Scientists
In light of these considerations, what evidence is there of a
myside bias in scientists’ reasoning? Here we consider
three types of evidence: experimental, ethnological and
historical.
Michael Mahoney conducted some early experiments on
scientists’ myside bias. One relied on the 2–4–6, a standard
task used to establish the existence of a myside bias,
comparing the behavior of physical scientists, psycholo-
gists and ministers (Mahoney and DeMonbreun 1977).5
Both groups of scientists behaved like typical participants;
only the ministers seemed better able to question their own
hypotheses. The scientists rarely put forward tests that they
thought would support their hypotheses; they were even
very likely to stick to falsified hypotheses. As a result,
fewer than 40 % of them were able to arrive at the correct
rule, a result that is hard to account for within any nor-
mative framework, given the simplicity of the task.
The limitation of this experiment is that it lies outside
the scientists’ field of expertise. Demonstrations of myside
bias when scientists reason about their own field are more
pertinent. Mahoney (1977) also offered such a demon-
stration by having psychologists review a fake article that
either supported the scientists’ theories or not. The psy-
chologists were much more critical when the article’s result
opposed their favored theory. Koehler (1993) obtained
similar results while specifying that such apparently biased
evaluations were coherent with a Bayesian interpretation.
However, Koehler also noted several elements strongly
suggesting that a genuine myside bias was at play. For
instance, in the Mahoney experiment the reviewers rated
even something as neutral as data presentation better when
the article’s conclusion supported their views. In the
Koehler experiment, the difference in the ratings between
an article that supported or did not support the scientist’s
view grew stronger as the criteria grew more malleable,
suggesting that scientists were using the wiggle room
offered by soft criteria to justify rejecting articles with
undesirable conclusions.
Some ethnographic data also points towards the presence
of a myside bias in scientists’ reasoning. Particularly
revealing is Kevin Dunbar’s study of scientists dealing with
unexpected results. An unexpected result should be more
interesting than an expected result, since it carries more
information. However, reasoning as an argumentative
capacity should have a peculiar way of paying attention to
unexpected information, at least when it flouts the reasoner’s
argumentative goals: reasoning should find reasons to dis-
regard inconvenient information. Some of Dunbar’s obser-
vations show exactly that: ‘‘individual scientists… usually
attributed inconsistent evidence to error of some sort and
hoped that the findings would go away’’ (Dunbar 1995,
p. 380). In a more extensive analysis of this phenomenon,
Fugelsang et al. (2004) report that this strategy of blaming
inconsistent results on technical problems was resorted to in
nearly 90 % of the cases. The Duhem–Quine thesis explains
that this strategy can always be appealed to without being
inconsistent. It can also be a rational, Bayesian, strategy if the
prior belief in the truth of the tested hypothesis is very high.
However, it is unlikely that the tests used by scientists have
such a high average of false negative, and the opinion of
other scientists on the same result suggests that some ratio-
nalizing is at play, as we will see later.
Dunbar notes that scientists can also react in a more
rational manner, for instance when an unexpected result
only requires a minimal change in their hypotheses to be
accommodated (Dunbar 1995). More interestingly, scien-
tists also take unexpected results in stride when they are
observed early in a research program and when they
challenge core hypotheses of their field (Dunbar 1997).
This makes sense if one considers that only in a few cases
will such core hypotheses ‘belong’ to the scientists in the
sense that scientists have a high stake in proving them
right. On the contrary, scientists can greatly benefit from
mounting a credible challenge to such core hypotheses.
Finally, Dunbar notes that senior scientists are less likely
than their junior colleagues to discount inconvenient
results. We will come back in the next section to this
apparent attenuation of the myside bias.
5 The 2–4–6 does not provide a straightforward demonstration of the
myside bias, but it can still be interpreted as strongly suggesting its
presence (see, Klayman and Ha 1987; Mercier and Sperber 2011a).
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Many episodes in the history of science can be inter-
preted as indicating a myside bias. A good way to find such
episodes is to look for egregious breaches of normative
standards of rationality that further a scientist’s argumen-
tative aims. For instance, when Linus Pauling was
embroiled in a battle over the efficacy of vitamin C as a
cure for cancer, he tried to discredit his opponents’ clinical
trial. To do so, he published a mathematical model of the
requirements for a sound clinical trial in cancer research
(Pauling and Herman 1989). The only study to fall short of
these standards was a recent and widely publicized failure
to find any link between vitamin C and remissions in
cancer patients. The fact that Pauling’s model singled out,
out of thousands of clinical trial, the study that had done
the most to weaken his position is very unlikely to be the
result of an unbiased process. Crucially, Pauling’s case is
only relevant to the point in hand if the bias was uncon-
scious: if he believed he was doing his best to establish
what is the truly case. While this matter is obviously dif-
ficult to settle definitively, Pauling’s private behavior
suggests that he genuinely believed in the efficacy of
vitamin C and in the validity of his efforts to prove as much
(Collins and Pinch 2005).
Social historians of science have also analyzed the
potential biases occurring when scientists side with one of
two competing theories during scientific controversies (e.g.
Pickering 1980). As part of their work, scientists have to
judge what are the important data and what data can be
disregarded, and they have to decide what is a reliable
method and what is not. Thus, methods and evaluative
criteria are sometimes forged at the same time as they are
being used for telling apart empirical claims. This provides
scientists with wiggle room for the interpretation and
selection of evidence. In this context, scientists are biased
to the extent that they favor the methods and criteria that
help supporting their already held beliefs. But, the argu-
ment goes, in the absence of independent and foundational
scientific method, they are nearly sure to do so.
The scope of this type of circularity between method
selection and theory choice is disputable, since methodo-
logical and epistemological beliefs are typically more
entrenched than scientific empirical beliefs. Yet, numerous
historical studies show the biased reliance on advanta-
geous, from the argumentative point of view, interpretative
framework. For instance, during the controversy between
Millikan and Ehrenhafts over the elementary electrical
charge, Millikan selected out many observations that
Ehrenhafts would have kept (Holton 1978). Millikan
claimed there was an elementary electric charge and
measured it to be 4.774 (±0.009) 9 1010 esu (unit of
electric charge, statcoulomb); Ehrenhafts claimed, on the
contrary, that there was smaller electric charges. Millikan
published his oil drop experiment in 1908: it provided a
good experiment for measuring the elementary electric
charge. But in 1910, Ehrenhaft reported having found
electric charges ranging from 7.53 9 1010 esu down to
1.38 9 1010 esu. Ehrenhaft empirical results about ‘‘sub-
electrons’’ was challenging all believers in e * 4.6 9 1010
as the quantum of charge. During the Millikan–Ehrenhaft
controversy, each was criticizing the method, and the
experimental and mathematical analyses of the other.
Ehrenhaft, in particular, calculated—on the basis of Mil-
likan’s data!—a wide spread of values for electric charges,
which would not warrant Millikan’s calculation of e. Of
course, Millikan also criticized Ehrenhaft’s calculation.
In the dispute between these two serious and recognized
scientists, where does the bias lie? From the analysis of
Millikan’s notebook, Holton (1978) found out that several
data points from the oil drop experiments were missing
from Millikan’s 1913 paper: 58 out of 140 observations of
falling oil drops were reported. There is no need to discuss
the extent to which Millikan used strict preset criteria for
dismissing observations as uninformative here: philoso-
phers and historians of science alike agree that the selection
is guided by a theoretical assumption saying that there exist
an elementary charge, which provides warrant to the
selection (Holton 1978; Barnes et al. 1996). With all that, it
seems that, this time and in contrast to Pauling’s case, it is
the bias in favor of a theoretical assumption that truly
helped Millikan to tell apart reliable from unreliable
observations. He received the Nobel prize in Physics in
1923. At that time, Ehrenhaft was not really taken seriously
anymore. Ehrenhaft had started with believing in the
existence of a basic electric charge of 4.6 9 1010 esu, but
was then convinced by his experimental results that it was
not the case.
Even though, in such examples, it is difficult to dem-
onstrate the presence of a myside bias with absolute cer-
tainty, the evidence is certainly suggestive of its presence.
More generally, the experimental, ethnographic and his-
torical evidence reviewed here strongly indicates that, as
laypeople, scientists exhibit a myside bias when they
reason.
4 Evaluating One’s Own Reasons
4.1 The Cost Benefit Analysis
From the perspective of the argumentative theory, it makes
sense to have a myside bias: conviction is better achieved
by finding arguments for one’s point of view than against
it. However, psychological studies show that reasoning not
only has a myside bias, but also that it tends to produce
relatively poor, superficial reasons (e.g. Kuhn 1991; Per-
kins 1985). For instance, when asked to defend their
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positions on social issues, many people provide circular
explanations, and few manage to generate genuine evi-
dence (Kuhn 1991). This trait seems to be harder to rec-
oncile with the argumentative perspective: shouldn’t a
mechanism designed to convince produce very strong
arguments?
Undoubtedly, failing to convince one’s audience carries
some costs: not only the missed opportunity to influence
someone, but also the risk that poorly though out argu-
ments might make one look incompetent. However, this is
not the only cost that should be taken into account.
Although the costs are of a different nature—time and
energy that could be devoted to other tasks—finding good
arguments is also costly. A well-designed reasoning
mechanism should only look for a better argument if it is
worth it. In a typical informal discussion, the costs of
failing to convince are limited: if a first argument fails,
more can be offered, and no one expects a Ciceronian
oration. Moreover, figuring out what argument is going to
speak to any particular audience’s beliefs, preferences and
desires can be very difficult. Instead of spending a lot of
effort anticipating someone’s counterargument, it is gen-
erally more efficient to advance the first vaguely decent
argument we can think of; if it fails to convince, not only
can we have other chances, but our interlocutor is likely to
help us by saying why she disagrees and why she wasn’t
swayed by the argument.
To the extent that this type of informal discussion
constitutes the normal context for reasoning, it is only to be
expected that reasoning shouldn’t bother looking for strong
arguments at the outset. Instead, people should be able to
adapt their arguments as their audience provides them with
feedback leading to an increase in the appropriateness and
general quality of the arguments as the discussion moves
on (for some suggestive evidence, see Kuhn and Crowell
2011; Resnick et al. 1993). This doesn’t mean, however,
that reasoning should be incapable of adjusting its settings
if the balance of costs and benefits varies. In a context in
which producing mediocre arguments can have costly
consequences and finding better arguments isn’t too diffi-
cult, we should expect reasoning to engage in more internal
filtering of arguments, leading to a higher average quality
in argument production.
4.2 The Case of Science
The first prediction stemming from these considerations is
that argument quality should increase when people
exchange arguments. Dunbar’s observations of lab meet-
ings seem to fit this pattern: scientists often start with easily
refuted arguments and then move on to increasingly well-
supported hypotheses to account for their results (Dunbar
1995).
While it would be hard to contest that discussions have
allowed scientists to refine their arguments, the actual
exchange of arguments seems less necessary in science.
The ‘solitary genius’ view of science is in large part a
figment of the popular imagination (Shapin 1991), but it is
not wholly unfounded: Newton’s annus mirabilis was a
lonely one, Darwin spent years refining his theory with
little feedback, Einstein was academically isolated when he
conceived of both relativity theories. How can the argu-
mentative theory of reasoning account for such fantastic
feats of (apparently) solitary reasoning? It seems that sci-
entists, much more than laypeople, have the ability to refine
their arguments on their own.6
The first factor that is likely to improve the tendency of
scientists to evaluate their own arguments is the costs
associate with the lack of such evaluation. In science, weak
arguments often carry a cost: papers get rejected, reputa-
tions suffer. To take an extreme example, Darwin clearly
understood the risks he was taking by publishing his the-
ory: that’s why he wanted to hone his arguments so well.
This explains why scientists, especially in their public
statements—presentations, articles, books—can raise the
level of argumentation through prior ratiocination. Scien-
tists mentally simulate argumentation because the
requirements, with regard to its quality, are higher. Note,
however, that the cost-benefit analysis remains essentially
social, as it balances the chances of convincing others and
those of looking foolish when a weak argument is
produced.
The second factor that should improve ratiocination
when scientists reason about their field of expertise is the
degree of shared beliefs. In informal conversations—
deciding where to go on a vacation for instance—prefer-
ences, desires and personal idiosyncrasies are likely to play
an important role. Such factors are difficult to anticipate in
producing arguments, making the reliance on the back and
forth of conversation to improve argument quality critical.
By contrast, such personal factors are supposed to be
absent in scientific arguments. There should be no (at least,
far less) need to anticipate other scientists’ tastes or per-
sonal histories. Instead, scientific arguments must rely on
shared elements: not only shared factual or theoretical
beliefs, but also shared epistemic beliefs—beliefs about
what a good argument looks like. A highly regulated dis-
cipline in that matter is mathematics: everything that can
figure in a proof is preset (some axioms, or some corpus of
mathematical properties and theorems) and the inferential
steps are highly regulated (for instance, it is not possible, in
contemporary mathematics to say ‘‘we see from the figure
6 Regarding the possibility of anticipating counter-arguments, the
view developed here is somewhat more optimistic than that exposed
in Mercier and Sperber (2011a, b).
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that…’’). Kuhn’s notion of paradigm also implies a high
degree of shared knowledge among scientists about what
can be taken for granted when providing reasons. Years of
training make the search for the premises for held con-
clusion much less costly: these premises are to be found in
the well-rehearsed common beliefs of the scientific
community.
When scientists share many beliefs, the anticipation of
counter-arguments is made much more productive. If, in
the course of ratiocination, a scientist finds a counter-
argument, it is likely that someone would have found it too,
so it needs to be anticipated; if she doesn’t find any, then
others mightn’t either. As a result, a scientist is much more
likely to improve her arguments through ratiocination than
someone anticipating an everyday discussion.
These two factors conspire to explain scientists’ ten-
dency to engage in productive ratiocination: they face high
costs if they produce weak arguments, and they can rela-
tively easily anticipate other scientists’ counter-arguments,
thereby increasing the quality of their own arguments.
Crucially, both factors are social: the costs take the form of
a loss of reputation if too many weak arguments are pro-
duced, and the ease with which counter-arguments can be
anticipated depends on the degree of shared beliefs in the
community. However, another interpretation of the efficacy
of scientists’ ratiocination could be that scientists have a
different reasoning ability, that they can spontaneously
exert a higher control over their own arguments, or that
their subject matter naturally lends itself to superior rati-
ocination. At least two elements militate against this indi-
vidualistic interpretation.
First, Dunbar’s ethnographic observations point to a
learning curve in the ability to anticipate other scientists’
counter-arguments. Junior scientists get their rationaliza-
tions shot down in lab meetings. Senior scientists go
straight to the stage of generating alternative hypotheses.
Presumably, they do so because they have learned to
anticipate their colleague’s counter-arguments. Second,
when the pressure to produce strong argument eases, even
the best reasoners lower their standards. The most dramatic
case might be Newton’s. Before submitting the Principia to
his peers’ evaluation, which he knew would be intense, he
made sure all the arguments were sound. By contrast,
Newton didn’t intend his alchemical writings to be publi-
cized, and the quality of the arguments drops dramatically,
from mathematical demonstrations in the Principia to
vague allegories in the alchemical notes (Hall 1996; Prin-
cipe 2004).
Even if scientists are able, to some extent, to criti-
cally evaluate their own arguments, the most cost-
effective solution remains to let others do it for them:
to make the best of argumentative discussions, as
presently suggested.
5 Evaluating Other People’s Reasons
So far, we have focused on the production of argument.
People do evaluate—often minimally, sometimes more
thoroughly—their own arguments in order to weed off the
poorest ones, but the argumentative theory of reasoning
suggests that evaluation should be more spontaneous, more
thorough, and also more objective when it bears on other
people’s arguments. One function of reasoning, indeed, is
to evaluate other people’s arguments in order to change
one’s mind when it is warranted. Accordingly, people
should be able to reject weak arguments and accept strong
ones.
In the last section, we reviewed evidence showing that
people are, on the whole, not very exigent when it comes to
their own arguments. Crucially, there is also substantial
evidence that people are good at evaluating other people’s
arguments. Not only do people reject fallacious arguments,
but they are convinced when strong reasons are presented
(e.g. Hahn and Oaksford 2007; Petty and Wegener 1998).
What of scientists? Are they also able to reject weak
arguments and accept good ones? It seems to us that the
former charge is rarely seriously leveled against scientists:
they rarely become convinced of a new claim when it is
poorly supported; especially if their current beliefs make
the truth of the claim improbable. By contrast, scientists
have often been charged with pigheadedness, with a refusal
to accept new theories, however well supported. The most
famous of these charge was made by Max Planck, who
contended that ‘‘A new scientific truth does not triumph by
convincing its opponents and making them see the light,
but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new
generation grows up that is familiar with it.’’ (Planck 1968,
pp. 33–34). According to this view, scientists never change
their minds, revolutionary ideas have to wait for a new
generation to be accepted. Such a dire assessment would be
difficult to reconcile with the argumentative theory of
reasoning. The goal of this section is to explore the ways in
which claims about scientists’ pigheadedness can be tested
and to suggest that the existing evidence supports the more
optimistic view, that of the argumentative theory.
People’s ability to evaluate arguments and to change
their mind when faced with good arguments can be mea-
sured indirectly, by looking at the outcome of bouts of
argumentation. In the course of argumentation, people
alternate turns of argument production and argument
evaluation. If the latter functions properly, the person who
is right should convince her interlocutor more often than
the other way around. Many experiments have demon-
strated as much; however, only a few are relevant to the
case of scientists. Okada and Simon (1997) have demon-
strated that discussion in pairs greatly improves the way
laypeople construct and test hypotheses when faced with a
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scientific problem. Dunbar’s ethnographic studies of lab
meetings show junior scientists being convinced to reject
their hasty rationalizations and forced to develop new
hypotheses instead (Dunbar 1995).
However, people who follow Planck in deploring the
pace at which new scientific theories are accepted have a
different scale in mind: the scientific community as a
whole, not small scale discussions. Several factors other
than the properties of reasoning could account for the pace
in the adoption of a new theory by the scientific commu-
nity. Slow adoption rates could be perfectly rational:
maybe the revolutionary theory is only tentatively sup-
ported, with the weight of the evidence still falling behind
the current paradigm. For instance, it has been argued that
initial rejection of continental drift was quite rational
(Thagard and Nowak 1990). Even when pigheadedness is
not normatively defensible, it might not be attributable to
reasoning. A scientist might privately appreciate the value
of a new theory while holding on to the existing paradigm
for strategic reasons: to protect her career, her reputation.
Such an outcome would not be an indictment of scientists’
reasoning, but of the place of reasoning in science. Con-
versely, fast adoption rates might be driven by social fac-
tors—following some more prestigious peers maybe—
rather than by a thorough assessment of the arguments
supporting a new theory. Although it is difficult to disen-
tangle these explanations, we argue presently that the his-
torical evidence supports the idea that good arguments
allow new scientific theories to promptly spread through
the community.
Most quantitative studies of the diffusion of scientific
theories have addressed a particular thesis shared by
Planck and Kuhn: that older scientists are more resistant to
change than their younger peers (see Wray 2011). By
examining the historical record, these studies have
repeatedly failed to find support for this thesis: younger
scientists are barely more likely to take new theories in
stride (Hull et al. 1978; Levin et al. 1995). Furthermore,
the scientists under study nearly always ended up
accepting the new theory, sometimes within a relatively
short time period. For instance, although the revolutionary
theory of plate tectonic was only developed in the mid-
1960s, it gained such rapid acceptance that by the early
1970s it had made its way into textbooks (Oreskes 1988).
By the end of the 1970s, close to 90 % of geologists—at
least in the American sample of Nitecki et al. (1978)—
thought the theory established.
Although Kuhn is often remembered for explaining
resistance to, rather than acceptance of, new scientific
theories, he did not share Planck’s severe pronouncement;
for Kuhn ‘‘[b]ecause scientists are reasonable men, one or
another argument will ultimately persuade many of them’’
(Kuhn 1962, p. 157). The available historical evidence
suggests that Kuhn was, if anything, underestimating sci-
entists’ ability to accept new theories.
Even if scientists accept relatively promptly new theo-
ries, one could still question the role of argument evalua-
tion in this process. Instead of being convinced by cogent
arguments, scientists could follow prestigious colleagues at
first, and then the majority of their peers. However, sci-
entists don’t simply have to follow the right theory as if it
was a mere fashion. They have to work with it, to under-
stand its details and implications. One hardly sees how that
would be possible if they did not appreciate the bulk of the
arguments supporting the new theory. Accordingly, when
scientists have left traces of the process that led them to
change their minds, they often make references to being
‘converted’ by the arguments offered in support of the new
theory (Cohen 1985).
If adoption of new scientific theories is driven by suc-
cessful argumentation, it should be possible to make more
specific prediction about the speed at which these theories
are adopted. Theories that clash more strongly with the
existing paradigm should take longer to accept—a point
that hardly needs to be belabored here. Two other factors,
more specific to argumentation, are worth exploring: the
degree of interactivity of scientific communication, and the
degree of shared beliefs in a scientific community.
As discussed above, more interactive contexts make for
more efficient argumentation, as they allow counter-argu-
ments to be addressed and better arguments to emerge.
Scientific communication comes in more or less interactive
forms, with the informal discussion at one end, the pub-
lished article at the other, and the conference presentation
somewhere in between. While the less interactive formats
can reach more people, they should be less convincing,
ceteris paribus, as they make it harder to address the
audience’s reservations. This decrease in convincingness
predicts specific spatial patterns in the diffusion of scien-
tific research and the formation of intellectual schools
based on geography—who can talk to whom.
Another factor critical to successful argumentation is
shared beliefs between arguer and audience. If two people
disagree about everything, they have no lever to convince
each other with. Scientific communities differ in the degree
of shared beliefs between their members. At one end we
find communities of mathematicians, in which at any given
time members agree about whether a given proposition is a
theorem a conjecture. Mathematicians also seem to share
their judgment of new proofs, allowing them to reach
consensus promptly once new proofs are offered (Azzouni
2007). Strikingly, this is true even when the proof demol-
ishes a research program central to the field. A few years
after Go¨del had submitted his first incompleteness theorem,
most major mathematicians had accepted it (Mancosu
1999). At the other end of the spectrum we find human
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sciences, which often harbor at the same time schools in
fundamental disagreement with each other. Accordingly, in
such divided fields new theories take longer to settle, if
they ever do.
The degree of shared beliefs also mitigates the need for
interaction in argumentation. Convincing an audience with
very different beliefs is difficult, as each audience member
is likely to reject the speaker’s arguments for different
reasons. Even if it were possible to anticipate all of these
reasons, their inclusion in an argument would make most of
the argument irrelevant to each audience member. By
contrast, an audience with mostly shared beliefs will pro-
duce less idiosyncratic counter-arguments, making the
counter-arguments easier to address. For instance, a
mathematician is in a good position to find most of the
potential counter-arguments to her proof with the help of a
few colleagues. These counter-arguments can be addressed
in the final proof, making it more convincing not only to
these few colleagues, but probably to the community as a
whole. As a result, in a community with many shared
beliefs, the temporal gap between convincing one’s close
colleagues and convincing the whole community can be
very short.
It might be worth here dispelling what might seem like a
contradiction between the conclusion of this section—on
the whole, argument evaluation works well in science—
and the arguments used to demonstrate myside bias among
scientists in Sect. 3.2. In Sect. 3.2, we claimed that
reviewers were biased in evaluating articles. In the current
section, we defend the relative impartiality of argument
evaluation. To reconcile these claims, we must stress the
importance of dialogue for the success of argumentation.
When a reviewer evaluates the arguments in an article, and
unless they are perfectly persuasive, she is bound to start
producing counter-arguments, as she would in a discussion.
However, by contrast with a discussion, these counter-
arguments will not be immediately addressed. Instead, they
will influence the reviewer’s overall evaluation of the
article. What should be essentially an evaluative task is in
fact at least as much a production task and, as a result, it
shares the biases of argument production. By contrast, in
the current section we looked either at small-scale discus-
sions or at the large-scale diffusion of scientific ideas—
which presumably involves a great many discussions. In
both cases, the discussions allowed counter-arguments to
be examined and, when the new theory is sound, dismissed.
6 Conclusion
Reasoning can be defined as a cognitive mechanism that
produces and evaluates reasons. It is a very specific
mechanism that we identified by its output: arguments and
epistemic evaluation of arguments. This mechanism is
generally understood as having an individualist aim:
helping the lone reasoner improve her beliefs and deci-
sions. However, many observations—in particular failures
of reasoning documented by experimental psychologists—
are difficult to reconcile with this view. An alternative is to
consider that reasoning has a social function. This is the
route followed by the argumentative theory of reasoning,
which suggests that the function of reasoning is to find
reasons to convince others and to evaluate others’ reasons
so as to be convinced when, and only when, appropriate.
The argumentative theory of reasoning clashes with
several common beliefs about scientists’ reasoning. On the
one hand, scientists are often seen as lonely geniuses,
working out grand theories in isolation. This is hard to
reconcile with the biases that affect solitary reasoning: the
myside bias and the difficulty of thoroughly evaluating
one’s own arguments. Several research strategies are
available in view of this apparent contradiction. First,
assert that scientific reasoning is essentially different from
laypeople’s reasoning. There is some truth to that claim
since scientific reasoning is regulated by institutions and
historically developed epistemic beliefs that specify what
counts as a good argument. However, when studying the
evolved cognitive basis of scientific reasoning, we focus on
an ability that is shared by all humans. Our approach is a
contribution to the naturalistic program in science studies,
which questions how scientists manage to do what they do
given that they are evolved social animals. The second
possible strategy consists in asserting that the argumenta-
tive theory of reasoning is refuted by scientists’ epistemic
achievements. Such a claim would, however, be mis-
guided, because the central claim of the argumentative
theory of reasoning is about the biologically evolved
function of reasoning. Scientists’ cognitive practices are
not so representative of the normal effect of a capacity that
would have favored its biological evolution. At this stage
of research, therefore, it is better to consider scientists’
cognitive achievements as a normal problem for the theory
rather than as refutation. There nonetheless remains a
challenge: how to explain the scientific achievements in
spite of constitutive bias in reasoning. We recognize that
this challenge must be met for the argumentative theory of
reasoning to remain plausible. This is why we dedicated
this paper to providing some elements of answer. These
elements are of two kinds. First, it appears that scientists
are also subjects to the biases predicted by the argumen-
tative theory of reasoning; second, the specific argumen-
tative context of science explains why scientists can, to
some extent, limit the influence of these biases. We hope to
have provided, on the basis of the argumentative theory of
reasoning, explanatory elements for some of the observed
cognitive biases and achievements of science.
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Scientists are also often believed to be resistant to new
theories, even if the theories are well supported. Such an
observation would also be difficult to reconcile with the
argumentative theory, since this theory predicts that rea-
soning should allow people to change their mind when they
are faced with good arguments. Again, the evidence sup-
ports the prediction of the argumentative theory rather than
the common perception. On the whole scientists, junior or
senior, are apt to accept new theories, even if the theories
challenge central assumptions of their field.
If scientists reason like everyone else, are prone to the
same mistakes, how can science be so successful? The
argumentative theory, and the broader framework it is a
part of, can also suggest answers to this question. Here we
have only hinted at these answers.
First, science might be an epistemically successful
institution because it makes the best of reasoning as an
argumentative skill. The dynamic of argumentation, we
pointed out, is more likely to lead to true beliefs than lonely
ratiocination, and the traditions and institutions of science
foster and empower argumentation. In particular, scientists
are encouraged to exert a sound skepticism: when it comes
to evaluating the interpretation of results, experts are
expected to rely on the arguments presented rather than on
who presents them. This, together with other epistemic
practices, allows efficient filtering of poorly supported
ideas. This filtering is efficient because it results from a
discursive dynamic where scientists judge others’ ideas and
arguments—an enterprise where the evolved function of
reasoning is directly serving epistemic goals—rather than
just their own.
Second, and crucially, science has developed ways to
work around reasoning’s limitations. In particular, it has
evolved complementary means to resolve disagreements:
experiments and other forms of systematic data gathering
together with pre-established agreement on the role they
can take in argumentation. These mechanisms supplement
argumentation and provide an even finer way to tell right
from wrong.
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